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THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STANDARDS ADOPTED TO STOP THE 
PARTICIPATION OF CHILDREN IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS 
JOSEPH N. MADUBUIKE-EKWE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past century, the face of warfare has changed drastically, making it 
exceedingly difficult to distinguish between civilians and soldiers on the 
one hand, and children and adults on the other. lOver the last decade, 
two million children have been made orphans, over six million have been 
seriously injured, or permanently disabled, and over ten million have 
been left with grave psychological trauma. 2 A large number of children 
especially young women have been made targets of rape and other forms 
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I. See Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers-The use of children as instruments of war, 23 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 499, 509 (2000) discussing that wars have moved from well defined 
battlefields to populated areas such as villages. 
2. Id.; see also, Olara Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for 
Children and Anned Conflict, at a press briefing on the Protection of Iraqi Children during Conflict 
(March 21, 2003), (visited March 24, 2003) <httpII157.l50.184.6/0SRSGCAAClEast.cfm?>; see 
also, speech of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the celebration of World day of Peace (Jan. I, 
1999); see also, Norimitsu Onishi, Children of War in Sierra Leone Try to Start Over, N.Y TIMES, 
May 9, 2000, at A14, available at <http:/www.crin.org.lresourceslinfodetail.org>. 
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of sexual violence as a deliberate instrument of war. At present, there 
are over twenty million children who have been displaced by war within 
and outside their countries. 3 Some three hundred thousand young per-
sons under the age of eighteen are currently serving in armed conflicts 
around the world. 4 Despite the United Nations' achievements with 
peacekeeping missions, ethnic conflicts continue to rise and new states 
continue to expand the international community. The global community 
must work collectively to establish a legal framework regarding the in-
creased use or participation of children in armed conflicts. 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the participation of children in armed 
conflicts around the world and the various international legal standards 
adopted to stop it. The paper will first describe the factors that contribute 
to the involvement of children in armed conflicts. It will examine the 
relevant international armed conflict (humanitarian) laws and other legal 
standards governing the use of children in armed conflicts and their ef-
fectiveness. The paper will also discuss the United States position on the 
Global efforts to ban the use of children in armed conflicts. Finally, the 
paper will discuss the problems of implementation, compliance and en-
forcement of the various laws governing the use of children in armed 
conflicts and make recommendations on how to make the laws more 
effective in protecting the children from participating in armed conflicts. 
II. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE PARTICIPATION OF 
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT 
There are two categories of children in armed conflicts: child soldiers 
and civilian children. Throughout history, military groups have used 
children as soldiers, but in recent years, the deliberate recruitment of 
child soldiers has dramatically increased in many global conflicts. 5 
Since the end of the cold war, protecting children from grave human 
rights abuse has been extremely difficult because the nature of the 
world's conflict have become increasingly internalized, localized, and 
grounded in nationalistic, ethnic and religious dissension. 6 In these local-
ized conflicts, opposing sides do not distinguish between children and 
adults. Militia groups directly target and exploit children rather than 
3. See Otunnu, supra note 2. See also, Graca Machel, Child soldiers: An affront to humanity, 
(visited Apr. 2, 2003) <http:/www.un.org/rights/concerns.htm>. discussing that child soldiers are an 
affront to humanity [hereinafter Machel Stu~]. 
4. See Abbott, supra note I. 
5. Jd. 
6. See, When Children are Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1998, analyzing the changing dy-
namic and method of warfare. 
2
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 11 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol11/iss1/3
2005] CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICTS 31 
respecting International Humanitarian Law and protecting the children 
from threats of armed conflict. 7 
Nowadays, wars are no longer confined to well-defined battlefields, 
rather they occur in populated areas where recruiters can easily take chil-
dren out of buses, schools, and churches and away from their villages. 8 
Distinguishing between civilian and combatant becomes difficult as wars 
progress because the soldiers take over civilian territory blurring the lines 
between civilians and combatants.9 Military groups employ the battle's 
location for their benefit by exploiting children's presumed innocence 
through the utilization of children as spies and messengers. 1O Such an 
environment fosters mistrust and suspicion of all children, furthering the 
difficulty child soldiers face when attempting to reintegrate into their 
community. 
Technological developments have also contributed to the problem of 
child soldiers. Inexpensive new lightweight weapons have made it tragi-
cally easy to use children as cannon fodder in modern warfareY In 
Uganda, for instance, an AK-47 which is simple enough for a child often 
to strip and reassemble, can be bought for the same price as a chicken 
and, in Mozambique, for a bag of maize. 12 This newfound ease of arm-
ing children, coupled with drugs and alcohol given to children by mili-
tary leaders, transform these young boys and girls into executioners, as-
sassins and combatants. 13 
Military leaders recruit children when there is a shortage of adult sol-
diers.14 As time passes, increasing casualties and escalating conflicts 
lead to a desperate search for new recruits. To alleviate the manpower 
shortage, rebel and government forces look to the nation's youth to fill 
7. /d. "Wars today are ... fought by warlords who have little interest in the Geneva Convention 
and may view even infants as enemies." See also Abbott, supra note I. 
8. See Jimmy Carter, Kid Soldiers, War's most tragic Victim, USA TODAY, June 30,1998, at 
II A, discussing factors leading to the increase in Child Soldiers. See also ILENE COHN & GUY 
GOODWIN-GILL, CIllLD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICfS (1994). 
9. See, Machel Study, supra note 3. See also William Branigin, Gruesome scene: Edgy 
Soldiers Fire on Car and Kill Civilians, S.F. CHRONICLE, April I, 2003 at AI, reporting the shooting 
by US Marines of a four-wheel drive vehicle full of women and children at a checkpoint in Iraq 
during the conflict between the U.S. and Iraq. 
10. See UNICEF, Patterns in Conflict: Civilians are now the Target (visited Jan.30, 2003) 
<http/www.unicef.org/graca/pattems.htrn>; see also Abbott, supra note I. 
II. See Abbott, supra note 1; see also, Machel Study, supra note 3. 
12. See Abbott, supra note 1 
13. See Allison Dundes Renteln, The Child Soldiers: The Challenge of Enforcing International 
Standards, 21 WHITIIER L.REv.l91 (1999). 
14. See, Machel Study, supra note 9; see also Abbott, supra note I. For example in Angola, 
the civil war spanned over thirty years, making volunteers difficult to fmd especially after witnessing 
the effects of war on their predecessors. 
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their army ranks. 15 The children most likely to become soldiers are from 
impoverished and marginalized backgrounds or separated from their 
families. 16 Children from wealthier and more educated families are often 
left undisturbed or released if their parents can ransom them back. 17 
III. RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
Child soldiers are "recruited" in different ways. 18 Some are conscripted, 
others are press-ganged or kidnapped and still others are forced to join 
armed groups to defend their families. 19 Some join the army voluntarily. 
A. VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT 
In most cases, children voluntarily enlist in the armed forces. There are 
few, if any, known instances of a military group denying participation to 
underage volunteers. There are many cultural, economic, social, ideo-
logical and security reasons for volunteering. Often the culture of vio-
lence, the desperation for food, the need for security or the drive to 
avenge the death of family members prompts such unforced recruit-
ment. 20 
Children who grow up in a war-tom environment may feel obliged to 
join the military regime out of a sense of loyalty, ethnic grievance, 21 or 
merely in an attempt to survive. 22 For these children, the lack of an al-
ternative means to fulfill basic needs such as food and shelter is likely to 
lead to their participation in armed conflict. As such, any "choice" these 
children may have as to whether or not to enlist is illusory. In some 
cases, participating in war is glorified by their culture or held up as a sign 
of masculinity. 23 
IS. See. Machel Study. supra note 9; see also UNESCO; Global Perspectives-Human profile 
cases: Who are child and young adult soldiers? (visited 3/25/2003) 
<http:/giniel.sched.pitt.edulginie-crises-links/child soldierslhuman.html> [hereinafter Human profile 
cases]. 
16. See, Machel Study, supra note 3. 
17. [d. 
18. "Recruitment" covers any means (formal or de facto) by which a person becomes a mem-
ber of the armed forces or of an armed group, so it includes conscription (compUlsory/obligatory 
military service), voluntary enlistment, and forced recruitment. 
19. See UNICEF, Child Soldier Projects; The case of Sierra Leone (visited 2/2512003) 
<http:/ginie.sched.pitt.edulginie-crises-links/child soldiers/sierra Leone l.html>, discussing children 
who have been abducted and conscripted into the various warring factions. 
20. [d., see also Abbott, supra note I. 
21. See UNICEF, supra note 19 
22. See, Machel Study, supra note 3. 
23. See Rohan Gunaratna, LITE Child Combatants (visited Jan. 27, 2005) 
<http://ourworld.compuserve.comlhomepages/sinhalalchild.htm>, noting that children were attracted 
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B. FORCED RECRUITMENT 
Most anned groups recruit children by force. Anned groups use force to 
take children from schools, public places and even their own homes. 24 
During these abductions, armed groups may compel children to follow 
orders by threatening death or by forcing the children to commit atroci-
ties against family members and friends so that they become hardened to 
violence. 25 
Forced recruitment occurs even in states where legislation is in place to 
prohibit compulsory military service before the age of eighteen. 26 The 
non-existence of identification papers stating an individual's name and 
age, for instance, often facilitates the recruitment of minors. In these 
situations, even if minimum age requirements are in place, without iden-
tification papers recruiters may evade the law. As evidenced by the 
abuses committed in Sierra Leone, forced recruitment often becomes 
systematic due to the lack of serious legal ramifications which armed 
groups face. 27 
The most common form of forced recruitment is called press-ganging, 
where armed militia groups or police roam the streets and public gather-
ing places, including school gates, to round up individuals they come 
across.28 Forced recruitment may also be accomplished through intimi-
dation to make it appear voluntary. Some children receive military in-
doctrination in school programs, through the integration of military life 
into the general curricula. 29 Due to their young age, children cannot dif-
to the L TIE guerillas by the glamour and perceived respect it was paid by society. See also Abbott, 
supra note I, at 4. 
24. See AMNESTY INT'L U.K., IN THE FIRING LINE - WAR AND CHILDREN RIGHTS 61(1991) 
(hereinafter FIRING LINE) explaining that minors are recruited when the number of adult soldiers is 
insufficient. See also Stephanie H. Bald, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone Find Justicefor Its Children? 18 AM.U.INT'L L. REv. 537. 
25. See FIRING LINE, supra note 24, explaining that armed groups force children to take part in 
gruesome initiation ceremonies. See also Bald, supra note 24, describing the recruitment of child 
soldiers. 
26. See FIRING LINE, supra note 24, noting that "inefficiency, corruption or structural inade-
quacies" inhibit the effectiveness of legislation setting an age limit of eighteen for participation in 
armed conflicts. 
27. See Bald, supra note 24. See also, Hearings on U.S Ratification of the Optional protocols 
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 107th Con-
gress (2002) (testimony of Jo Becker, advocacy Director Children's Rights Division, Human Rights 
Watch, discussing the plight of Child Soldiers in more than thirty different world conflicts) (visited 
Jan. 31, 2003) <http/wwwlhrw.org/press/2002/03/childsoldiers0307.htm> [hereinafter Becker Hear-
ings]. 
28. See, Human Profile cases, supra note 15. 
29. Id.: see also Bald, supra note 24. 
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ferentiate between competing ideologies or fully appreciate the implica-
tions of their decisions and actions. 30 
C. EFFECT OF RECRUITMENT 
Armed groups treat child soldiers the same as adult recruits and do not 
afford children special treatment because of their age. 31 In some cases, 
children are viewed as possessing special attributes for high-risk func-
tions. They are forced to undertake more dangerous missions such as 
entering mine fields before older troops or being sent on suicide mis-
sions.32 
Once recruited into the military units, especially those of non-
governmental rebel groups, children face a life of violence and danger 
for which they are ill prepared. 33 As combatants,34 they stand to lose 
their civilian status and thus the protection that they would normally en-
joy under humanitarian law. 35 They are presented to the enemy as le-
gitimate targets of war. 36 The child soldier, like any other member of an 
armed force,37 is exposed to the traditional aims of warfare: the death and 
disablement of enemy personnel. 38 
The consequence of all these practices is death, permanent injury, psy-
chological trauma and social dislocation of the children.39 If children are 
to be spared this fate, they must be excluded from any form of participa-
tion in armed conflicts. As will be discussed later, several rules have 
been made to achieve this goal. The sources for these rules lie, among 
others, in humanitarian law and human rights law. While humanitarian 
law has a long tradition of protecting civilians (and by implication chil-
dren) from the effects of war, its field of application is restricted to 
30. See Bald, supra note 24. 
31. See id , (discussing how child soldiers in Sierra Leone during their civil war experienced 
beatings, forced marches carrying heavy loads, and separation from family). 
32. See, Becker Hearings, supra note 27, discussing how children are forced into hazardous 
roles. 
33. See, Criminalizing the Recruitment of Child Soldiers-Using Children in Armed Conflicts, 
in MONOGRAPH No.32: USING CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT: A LEGITIMATE AFRICAN 
TRADITION? (Dec. 1998) (visited April 6, 2003) 
<http:/www.iss.co.zalPubsIMonographs/N032/Ccriminalising.html> [hereinafter MONOGRAPH 
NO.32]. 
34. "Combatants" are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict as well as mem-
bers of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces; see LESLIE C. GREEN, THE 
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 108 (Manchester Univ. Press, 200 ed., 2000). 
35. "Humanitarian Law" is also called the "Laws of Armed conflict" or the "Laws of War." 
36. See MONOGRAPH No 32, supra note 33. 
37. ld. 
38. ld. 
39. See id.; see also, Machel Study, supra note 3. 
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armed conflicts. On the other hand, human rights law has the advantage 
of being more general since it is applicable at all times and in all places 
but until recently, it was not specifically concerned with the problem of 
child soldiers. 40 
Most of the laws concerning child soldiers are international and not mu-
nicipal or national laws. 41 Yet, international law governs the relationship 
of states, and this is the main obstacle to the effective application of rules 
of international law intended to protect the interest of individual human 
beings. Those most likely to be responsible for recruiting child soldiers 
are rebel groups. Rules of international law, however, are addressed to 
states with the result that non-governmental entities such as rebels, ir-
regular militias and armed insurgents are not bound, and the beneficiaries 
of the rules - children - have no enforceable rights. 42 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING 
CHILD SOLDIERS 
There are four kinds of international law in relation to child soldiers: 
International Humanitarian Law (otherwise known as the "Laws of 
Armed Conflict"), International Human Rights Law, International 
Criminal Law and the International Labour Law.43 
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMANIT ARIAN LAW 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) , also known as the "Laws of 
Armed Conflict," is the body of law which aims to regulate the conduct 
of armed conflict by establishing rules regarding methods of warfare and 
protection of victims. 44 During medieval times, the general principles of 
humanitarian law restricted the ways in which warfare may be con-
ducted.4s The principle of 'humanity' limited the choice of means to that 
most humane; the principle of 'necessity' permitted only a minimal 
amount of force to be used; and the principle of 'discrimination' stipu-
lated that only military targets could be attacked.46 Children, together 
with the sick, the elderly, and mothers of children (an especially vulner-
40. See MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33. 
41. "Municipal or National Laws" are the legal systems applied internally by states to those 
living within their borders under their national legal systems. 
42. See MONOGRAPH N0.32, supra note 33. 
43. See, Human Rights Watch: Child Soldiers: International Legal Standards Governing Child 
Soldiers (visited March 25, 2003) <http:/www.hrw.org.lcampaigns/crp/int-Iaw.htrn> [hereinafter 
Child Soldiers]. 
44. See MONOGRAPH N0.32, supra note 33. 
45. See Green, supra note 34. 
46. Id. 
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able category of civilians), derived their greatest measure of protection 
from the requirement that civilians and military targets were to be distin-
guished. 47 Yet even in 17th century Europe, established custom kept chil-
dren under twelve out of areas of conflict. 48 IHL therefore has afforded 
some degree of protection to children, but initially treated them only as 
civilians.49 
Humanitarian law first protected children, though indirectly, by promot-
ing family life under the Hague Convention. 50 After W orId War II, the 
customs, treaties and declarations governing the conduct of hostilities 
were defined, extended and codified in Four Conventions. These, and 
their subsequent protocols, are collectively known as the "GENEVA 
RULES." They are now synonymous with Humanitarian Law. 51 The 
Geneva Conventions did not set out to guarantee non-combatants immu-
nity from violence of war. Rather, the goal was to protect certain catego-
ries of persons who fell into the hands of an adversary during an armed 
conflict. 52 The Geneva Convention applies only to conflicts of interna-
tional character. 53 With regard to non-international armed conflicts, Ar-
ticle 3, which is common to all four of the Conventions extends certain 
minimum humanitarian protection to non-combatants and to the sick and 
the wounded. 54 Common Article 3 relates to treatment of non-
combatants and does not explicitly deal with the issue of child combat-
ants. Consequently, international law did not address the question of 
children participating in war. 
To address this question, two 'Additional Protocols' were adopted in 
1977 to supplement the four Geneva Conventions. The two protocols 
finally dealt directly with the role of children in armed conflicts, regulat-
47. See Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and 
annexed Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.l8, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277, T.S. No.539. [hereinafter Hague Convention] see also Hans-Peter Gasser, The u.s. Decision 
Not to RatifY Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims: An Appeal for 
Ratification by the United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L. L. 912,915 (1987). 
48. See MONOGRAPH No.32, supra note 33. 
49. See JENNY KUPER, INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING CHILD CiVILIANS IN ARMED 
CONFLICf, chap. 4 (1997). 
50. See Hague Convention, supra note 47. 
51. See MONOGRAPH N0.32, supra note 33. 
52. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.12, 
1949, No.973, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
53. "Conflicts of International Character" refer to wars, or armed conflicts between states 
through the medium of their armed forces. See, Green, supra note 34 at 54. 
54. Common Article 3 does not specifY the Law of War for non-international Conflict and 
does not contain a "grave breaches" provision mandating criminal punishment. 
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ing this phenomenon for the first time. ss Article 77 of Protocol I pro-
vides that: 
(2) The parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in 
order that children who have not attained the age of 15 years do 
not take a direct part in hostilities and in particular, they shall re-
frain from recruiting them into their armed forces. In recruiting 
among those persons who have attained the age of 15 years but 
who have not attained the age of 18 years, the parties to the con-
flict shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest. 
(3) If, in exceptional cases, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, 
Children who have not attained the age of 15 years take a direct 
part in hostilities and fall into the power of an adverse party, they 
shall continue to benefit from the special protection accorded by 
this Article, whether or not they are prisoners of war. S6 
This protocol has been criticized for requiring States to "take all feasible 
measures" to protect children from warfare. Such a low standard will 
allow a state party considerable freedom to evade the general prohibition. 
No minimum age limit was attached to the term "children" in Article 
77(2). This omission left an ambiguity that states could exploit to their 
advantage. S7 The Parties to the Protocol were obliged only to ensure that 
children did not take a "direct" part in hostilities. Qualifying the nature 
of participation in this manner fostered ambiguity and invited subjective 
interpretation by states. 58 
It is also futile to protect children only in cases of direct participation. 
Recent evidence shows that children who start their military engagement 
in a support role usually become active combatants. 59 Furthermore, per-
mitting any degree of participation undermines the principle at stake. 
Whether children participate directly or indirectly, they are in danger. 60 
Even low level involvement, such as a messenger or menial camp atten-
dant, exposes the individual to attack by the enemy. Association with a 
55. See Renteln, supra note 13; see also MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33. 
56. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 
1125 V.N.T.S. 3, 161.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol i); see also Renteln, supra note 13; see 
MONOGRAPH No.32, supra note 33. 
57. See MONOGRAPH No 32, supra note 33. 
58. Id. 
59. See R. Brett, Child Soldiers: Law, Politics and Practice, 4 iNT'L J. CHILDREN'S RTS 115, 
124, (Netherlands 1996). 
60. See MONOGRAPH No 32, supra note 33. 
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war effort means that if captured, a child could be treated as aspy, sabo-
teur or illegal combatant. 61 
To avoid the last possibility, paragraph (3) was added to Article 77. 
Without this addition, children under 15 who participate directly in hos-
tilities would stand to lose their entitlement to prisoner of war status un-
der the Third Geneva Convention. Hence Article 77(3) provided that for 
the purposes of the Fourth Convention, such children would still be 
deemed "protected persons."62 
Although Additional Protocol II, like Protocol I, was intended to sup-
plement the Common Article 3 provision in the four Geneva Conven-
tions on "non-international" armed conflicts, it also applies to conflicts 
not covered in Protocol IY These are defined in Article 1(1) of Protocol 
II as conflicts between state armies and "organized armed groups" which 
operate under a responsible command structure and exercise sufficient 
control over a portion of a state's territory to enable them to carry out 
sustained military operations. 64 Although Protocol II regulates the most 
serious and prevalent type of internal conflict, it does not apply to lesser 
forms of disorder, such as internal disturbances and tensions, including 
riots and isolated or sporadic acts of violence. 65 Article 4(3)(c) of Proto-
col II provides that in non-international armed conflicts, "children who 
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the 
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities." This is an 
innovative provision because it contains a total prohibition on participa-
tion, including even voluntary enlistment. Children are not to be in-
volved in any military operation, including transportation of ammunition 
and foodstuffs or acts of sabotage. 66 The language of the Protocol as-
cribes responsibility to those who allow children to participate rather 
than to the children themselves. 67 
61. Id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id.; see also Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past; The Implications of 
Prosecuting Children for Participating in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. 
REv. 629 (1997). 
64. See MONOGRAPH No32, supra note 33; see also Theodore Meron, On the Inadequate 
Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT'L. 
L. 589, 599 (1983); see a/so George H. Aldrich, Some Reflections on the Origins of the 1977 Geneva 
Protocols, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS 
PRINCIPLES 129 (Swinarski ed., 1984). 
65. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 
1(2), 1125 V.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
66. Protocol II, supra note 65, art. 4(3)(c); see a/so Reis, supra note 63. 
67. See Renteln, supra note 13. 
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It is noteworthy that Protocol II is binding on states as well as armed 
opposition groups. 68 Protocol II was intended to expand the scope of 
protection for victims in internal armed conflicts; unfortunately many 
states have not ratified it. Many states also deny that it applies to the con-
flicts in which they are involved because they claim that the conflicts are 
merely internal disturbances. 69 For example, the conflicts in Somalia, 
Afghanistan (under the Taliban), and Myanmar do not meet the threshold 
requirement of Protocol II. As such, children are being lost in gaps of 
existing international laws of war. 70 Since, there is also no body with 
authoritative power to declare what is a non-international armed conflict 
as opposed to a disturbance. It appears that the determination is left to 
the state party.7! 
The four Geneva Conventions and the two protocols afford protection to 
children in armed conflict in part by specifying age limits. They prohibit 
participation by those under fifteen and with regard to fifteen-to-
eighteen-year-olds, mandate enlisting older children first. 72 International 
usage has now settled on an age limit of fifteen as defining what "chil-
dren" mean when no further description is given. 73 Although these rules 
are widely supported, they have not achieved the status of customary 
international law. The consensus is not sufficient for purposes of opinio 
juris. 74 
IHL as defined in the four Geneva Conventions and the two protocols 
fails to protect many children from the tragedies of war. Many reasons 
account for this failure. First, most of the conflicts involving children are 
internal armed conflicts. 75 Second, many states have failed to ratify Pro-
tocol II. And last, the relevant norms are not considered part of custom-
68. See Protocol II, supra note 65, art. 4(3)(c). 
69. Because Protocol II uses a high threshold of application it enables states to deny that their 
internal conflicts are covered. They assert that their conflicts are merely riots or separate acts of 
violence. See GUY GOODWIN-GILL & ILENE COHN, CHILD SOLDIERS: THE ROLE OF CHILDREN IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS (1994). 
70. See Abbott, supra note 1; see also MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33. 
71. See Reis, supra note 63. 
72. See Protocol I, supra note 56; see also Protocol II, supra note 65, the protocols specify that 
those under 15 should not take a direct part in hostilities or be recruited. Existing standards differ on 
whether there should be prohibition of any participation in hostilities by children or whether they 
should proscribe only taking a direct part in hostilities. For example, Protocol II, art. 4(3)(c) prohib-
its any participation. On the other hand, Protocol I, art. 77(2) and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, art. 38(2) forbid only taking a direct part in hostilities. 
73. See JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY ON THE IV GENEVA CONVENTION 395(1958); see also 
Alex Obote-Odora, Legal Problems of Children in Armed Conflict, (visited April I, 2003) 
<http:/www.murdoch.edu.aulelaw/issues/v6n2/obote-Odora62 _ text.html>. 
74. "Opinio juris" is a subjective component necessary for a usage or practice of States to rise 
to the level of international customary law, it must be shown that the usage or practice is adopted as 
a matter of legal obligation, rather than prompted by moral rectitude or by force of habit. 
75. See Abbott, supra note 1. 
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ary international law. 76 These shortcomings of IHL, especially with ref-
erence to internal conflicts, have been acknowledged in the international 
community and have led to the development of global standards in other 
areas. 77 
B. THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
Article 38 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC)78addresses recruitment of child soldiers. It provides that: 
(1) State Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in 
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child. 
(2) State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of 15 years do not take a 
part in hostilities. 
(3) State Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has 
not attained the age of 15 years into their armed forces. In re-
cruiting among those persons who have attained the age of 15 
years but who have not attained the age of 18 years, states parties 
shall endeavor to give priority to those who are oldest. 
Clearly, Article 38(2) can hardly be said to have settled the problem of 
children becoming involved in hostilities. It merely repeats the terms of 
article 77(2), with all the ambiguities and failings of that article. 79 Article 
38 has been described as an anomaly in using a IS-year age minimum for 
child soldiers while in all other respects the CRC's general definitions of 
a child is any person below the age of 18.80 However, states in favour of 
the age 18 definition are free to interpret Article 38(2) in light of Article 
41 of the CRC, which provides that any conflict between the provisions 
of the Convention and obligations under municipal or international law 
must be settled in favour of whichever rule gives the child the greatest 
76. Customary international law is that part of international law which is based on the practice 
of States, general and consistent, fortified by "opinio juris" as a necessary component, and serves to 
complement norms codified in Conventions or Treaties. 
77. See, Machel Study, supra note 3. 
78. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G . .A. Res. 44125, 44 U.N. G.AOR Supp. 
No.49, U.N. Doc. Al44/73 [hereinafter CRC]. 
79. If a state is also a party to Protocol II, the Protocol obligations prevail over art. 38 of the 
CRC, since art. 41 of the CRC provides that" nothing in the present Convention shall affect any 
provisions which are more conducive to the realization of the rights of the child ... " CRC, supra note 
78. 
80. See Rentein, supra note 13. 
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protection. 81 To this end, when certain states such as Argentina and Aus-
tria ratified the CRC, they made special declarations that they would 
enforce the age of 18. As such, Article 38 of CRC was considered an 
innovation because it based human rights law on humanitarian law. The 
CRC applies to all children in all circumstances with the exception only 
of the United States and Somalia - the two countries not yet parties to 
it. 82 
The CRC has two main limitations. First, it generally limits only the 
conduct of states while leaving out non-state actors. Secondly, the fail-
ure of the United States to ratify the Convention, when virtually all the 
other countries in the world have done so, undermines its efficacy. 83 
C. THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE 
CHILD 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is the only 
regional treaty in the world which addresses the issues of child soldiers. 
It was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1990 and 
came into force in November 1999.84 It is clear and specific. It defines a 
"child" as anyone below 18 years of age without exception. 85 Article 
22(2) which forbids child soldiers provides: 
States parties to the present charter shall take all necessary steps 
to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and 
refrain in particular, from recruiting any child. 86 
It should be noted that the African Charter has stronger language - "take 
all necessary steps"87 - than the CRC, which merely asks states to "take 
all feasible measures."88 
D. THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court established a permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to try persons charged with commit-
81. See MONOGRAPH No.32, supra note 33. 
82. See, Child Soldiers, supra note 43. 
83. See Renteln, supra note 13. 
84. See Charter on The Rights and Welfare of the African Child, July 11, 1990, art. 22(2), 
OAU Doc., CABILEG.l24.9/49 (1990) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
85. See African Charter, supra note 84, art. 2. 
86. See African Charter, supra note 84. 
87. Id. 
88. See CRC, supra note 78. 
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ting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 89 The treaty 
gives the ICC jurisdiction over the war crimes of conscripting children 
under the age of fifteen into the national armed forces or armed groups, 
or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 90 In drafting the treaty, 
the delegates agreed that the terms ''using'' and "participate" would pro-
hibit not only children's direct participation in combat, but also their 
active participation in military activities linked to combat such as scout-
ing, spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys, as couriers, or at 
military checkpoints. 91 Also prohibited is the use of children in "direct" 
support functions such as carrying supplies to the front line. 92 
The ICC treaty substantially advances international law relating to the 
protection of children in armed conflict and the prosecution of violence 
against children. The treaty's list of war crimes includes intentional at-
tacks on educational institutions and schools, among other civilian build-
ings which have been frequently targeted in recruitment drives or as part 
of campaigns to terrorize civilian populations. 93 
E. THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted Convention 182, 
in June 1999, concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour. 94 The Convention commits each state 
which ratifies it to "take immediate and effective measures to secure the 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter 
of urgency."95 The term "child" applies to all persons under 18 years96 
and "the worst forms of child labour" includes, inter alia, "forced or 
compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict. "97 
Recommendation 190, accompanying Convention 182, encourages states 
to make such recruitment a criminal offense. This was the first time that 
89. See UN Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
AlCONF. 183/9,37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC]. 
90. See id. art. 2. 
91. See Human Rights Watch, Promises Broken: The International Criminal Court (visited 
march 25, 2003) <http:/www.hrw.org/campaignslcrp/promises/icc.htrnI> [hereinafter HRW: Prom-
ises Broken]. 
92. Id. 
93. See id.; In Uganda, the lord's resistance Army, "abducted children from their schools, 
communities and homes to camps in Sudan ... forcing them to commit atrocities and become sexual 
slaves". 
94. See International Labour Organization Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) (entry into force Nov. 19, 2000) 
[hereinafter Convention 182]. 
95. See id., supra note 94, art. I. 
96. See id. art. 2. 
97. See id. art. 3(a). 
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an 18-year minimum age limit was set in relation to child soldiering in an 
international treaty. It was also the first specific, legal recognition of 
child soldiering as a form of child labour. 98 
F. THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
THE CHILD ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED 
CONFLICT 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on May 25, 2000.99 It entered 
into force on February 12,2002. 100 The Convention raised the minimum 
age from 15 to 18 for direct participation in hostilities, for all recruitment 
into armed groups, and for compulsory recruitment by governments. 101 
However, states may continue to accept volunteers from the age of 16. 102 
On becoming parties to the Protocol, states have to deposit a binding 
declaration setting out their minimum voluntary recruitment age and the 
safeguards they have adopted to ensure that such recruitment is not 
forced or coerced. l03 They also have to maintain standards to ensure as a 
minimum, that the recruitment is genuinely voluntary, with the informed 
consent of the recruits' parents or legal guardians, and that the recruit is 
fully informed of the duties involved in the military service and provides 
reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military service. 104 
These declarations may be strengthened at any time but not weakened. 
In other words, a declaration can only be withdrawn in favour of a decla-
ration specifying a higher minimum voluntary recruitment age into the 
government armed forces, and not a lower one. 105 
In relation to armed groups, there is no requirement in the Optional Pro-
tocol that such groups are involved in armed conflict. This means that 
98. See Appendix 3. International Legal Protection for Children in Armed Conflict, (visited 
April 3, 2003) <http:/www.child-
soldiers.org/cs/childsoldiers.nsflf30d8b5e33403aI802SaeS003812 I 3/7945ef> [hereinafter Appendix 
3]. 
99. See Human Rights Watch, Child Soldiers and the Child Labor Convention (background 
briefing) (June IS, 1999) (visited Mar. IS, 2003) 
<http:/www.hrw.org/background/crp/labor6IS.htm> [hereinafter HRW Child Soldiers]; see also 
Human Rights Watch, Status of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (visited Jan. 27, 2005) 
<http:/www.hrw.org/carnpaigns/crp/ratifications.htm>;seealso.Child Soldiers, supra note 43. 
100. See HRW Child Soldiers, supra note 99. 
101. See, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. AlRES/S4/263 (2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. 
102. See Appendix 3, supra note 98. 
103. See Optional Protocol, supra note 101, art. 3(2). 
104. See id. art. 3(3). 
105. See id.; see also HRW Child Soldiers, supra note 99. 
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questions about whether or not a situation amounts to an armed conflict 
are irrelevant and that recruitment prior to the start of a conflict is cov-
ered. Furthermore, there is an obligation incumbent on all state parties to 
the Protocol to take all feasible measures to prevent recruitment and use 
of children under the age of 18 by armed groups including legal meas-
ures to prohibit and criminalize such practices. 106 
V. THE UNITED STATES POSITION 
The United States opposes international efforts to raise the minimum age 
for recruitment and participation in armed conflict from the current fif-
teen to eighteen. lo7 The U.S. position is based on U.S. recruitment prac-
tices, which allows seventeen-year-olds to enlist voluntarily for military 
service with parental permission.108 The U.S. position also stems from 
its reluctance to amend U.S. domestic laws and practice into compliance 
with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional 
Protocols along with the CRC. The U.S. also fears that establishing 
eighteen as the minimum age for participation in hostilities would pro-
vide evidence of customary international law because of the consistency 
with existing international norms. 109 
The United States further opposes the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) I lOon the grounds that it may exercise its jurisdic-
tion to conduct politically motivated investigations and prosecution of 
the U.S. military and political officials and personnel. III The U.S. spe-
cifically opposed the inclusion of the use of child soldiers in international 
armed conflict as a war crime under the jurisdiction of the ICC. IIZ In-
stead of supporting an effective international court that will punish viola-
tors for crimes against humanity and for war crimes, the U.S. continues 
106. See Optional Protocol, supra note 101, art. 3(2). 
107. The United States ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Anned Conflict on December 23, 2002; see Amnesty Inter-
national, Child Soldiers and the West Asian Crisis (2001) (visited April I, 2003) 
<http:/www.amnestyusa.orglchildrenlsoldierslwesasiancrisis.html> (discussing that the U.S accepts 
volunteers from the age of 17 years and until now has deployed 17 year olds in operations such as 
the Gulf War 1991, Somalia, and Bosnia). 
108. See Abbott, supra note I; see also HRW: Child Soldiers, supra note 99 (stating that ac-
cording to Department of Defense Statistics, there are less than 7000 minors in the U.S. armed 
services, making up less than one·half of one percent of the total 1.5 million active duty force, and 
only 45 of new active duty recruits each year). 
109. See Abbott, supra note 1. 
110. See ICC, supra note 89; see also, HR W: Promise Broken, supra note 91. 
111. See Philippe J. Sands, The Future a/International Adjudication, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1,4; 
see also Human Rights Watch, ICC: The United States and the International Criminal Court, (vis-
ited April 14, 2003) <http://www.hrw.orglcampaigns/icc/us.htm> [hereinafter HRW: The u.s. and 
ICC]. 
112. See Abbott, supra note 1. 
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to undennine international efforts to provide special protection for chil-
dren. Consequently, on May 6, 2002, the U.S. withdrew its signature on 
the ICC treaty. 113 
However, the U.S. Congress recently adopted a congressional resolution 
condemning the use of child soldiers in its Defense Appropriation Au-
thorization Act of 1999Y4 The U.S Senate also, by a unanimous con-
sent, voted to support ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on Involvement of Children in Anned 
Conflice l5 and consequently, ratified it on December 23, 2002.116 Al-
though the resolution does not bind the U.S., it constitutes a significant 
step in the right direction. Yet, it should be noted that the US failure to 
ratify Protocol I, CRC and the ICC deprived the world of a common 
framework for humanitarian rules governing anned conflicts. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES GOVERNING 
CHILD SOLDIERS 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that, there exist various treaties 
that prohibit the use of children in anned conflict. Unfortunately, prob-
lems remain with the effectiveness and enforceability of these rules of 
law. As a consequence, children remain vulnerable to the tragic effects 
of anned conflict. 
The problem is compounded by the inability of the international commu-
nity to agree on the age of recruitment and participation of a child in 
armed conflict. This allows states to pick and choose when a young per-
son is a child or an adult, for a purpose subjectively detennined by the 
state. Their purpose is "good" or "bad" depending on which side you are 
on. 
The Geneva Convention obliges State parties to prosecute violators of 
the Convention. However, the Fourth Geneva Convention does not spe-
cifically provide for a crime that would cover the recruitment of child 
soldiers.ll7 Protocol I does regulate recruitment of children but the activ-
ity is not mentioned in the description of "grave breaches."118 As such, 
the use of children as combatants is clearly in breach of Protocol I, but is 
113. See, HRW: The US and ICC, supra note 111. 
114. See Abbott, supra note 1. 
115. See Amnesty International, supra note 107. 
116. See id. 
117. See Protocol I, supra note 56. 
118. See id. art. 85. 
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not a criminal action attracting individual liability. For example, The 
Democratic Republic of Congo is a party to the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion and Protocol I, but the government can not prosecute individuals 
responsible for recruiting child soldiers. This is because the treaties do 
not contemplate this practice as a "grave breach" and therefore an inter-
national crime. In addition, neither the Convention nor Protocol I apply 
to the type of internal struggle being waged in the country. The Fourth 
Convention applies only to International Conflicts, and Protocol I to 
struggles of self-determination. 119 Furthermore, some states are reluctant 
to prosecute or extradite suspects in their territories. There is no interna-
tional police force with authority to arrest offenders hiding in such states 
and the principle Sovereignty of States precludes any concerned state 
from making the arrest itself. 120 
The cultural difference in the conceptualization of childhood further hin-
ders the ban on the use of children in armed conflict. 121 In many socie-
ties the distinction between childhood and adulthood is not clearcut. In 
some parts of Africa, 16 and 17 year old children from pastoral culture 
are expected to bear arms and fight - that being the only way to be initi-
ated into adulthood. 122 This rite of passage takes place soon after pu-
berty. In this culture, with or without law, children will always bear arms 
and join national armies or guerilla groups. 123 In other states, such as 
Rwanda, 17 year olds are no longer considered children. Individuals 
marry younger and are expected to contribute to the survival of the fam-
ily from an early age. 124 
The problem of implementation, enforcement and compliance with inter-
national rule is exacerbated where United Nations Peacekeepers are de-
ployed to stabilize conflict situations and to enforce compliance with 
international law.125 Instead of protecting children, the United Nations 
Peacekeepers exchange money, employment, goods or services for sex 
with girls they were meant to protect. 126 
119. See MONOGRAPH No. 32, supra note 33. 
120. See id. 
121. See Obote-Odora, supra note 73. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Mission Statement (visited 
Jan. 27, 2005) <http://www.U.N.org/depts/dpko/dpko/info/page3.htm>. 
126. See Jonathan Wald, u.N. Accuses Force of Sex Abuse, Sexual Abuse of Girls in Congo 
Continues, (visited Jan. 27, 2005) 
<http://cnn.com/2005/worldiafrica/01l08/congo.peacekeeper.sexi>; see Marc Lacey, In Congo War, 
Even Peacekeepers Add to Horror, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.28, 2004) (visited on Jan. 12, 2005) 
<http://www.Nytimes.com/> (portraying how a young girl, a frail fifth grader describes the tent 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Given the obstacles to enforcement of humanitarian and human rights 
laws with regard to the use of children in armed conflicts, the establish-
ment of the ICC would help in discouraging individuals from recruiting 
underage children into the army and hopefully minimize the participation 
of children in armed conflict. 127 Since most states are already in breach 
of the age limit on recruitment provided in the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 128 and there are no "police" to 
enforce these international rules, the international community should 
direct their efforts to the issue of forced recruitment of children. This is 
more fundamental than the issue of age limit as it cuts across both sides 
of the divide. Even if the states insist on using children in armed con-
flicts, the children should, at least, not be forced to fight. 129 
The international community should address the root causes of conflicts 
more than the instruments used in the conflict. If the root cause of a con-
flict is identified and settled, the problem of child soldiers will be solved. 
But if the root cause of the conflict is not identified and solved, the con-
flict will crop up again and children may be forced to fight again. 130 
The international community must work collectively to update existing 
rules of international law to reflect the increased participation of children 
in hostilities and to initiate the necessary enforcement and rehabilitation 
mechanisms. 131 The first step is to increase the visibility of the prob-
lem.132 In the case of child soldiers, the United Nations Security Council 
where a UN peacekeeper had forced himself on her. The UN soldier had used a cup of milk to lure 
her into bed.); see also Susannah Price, DR Congo Sex Abuse Claims Upheld (visited Jan. 19,2005) 
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uklmpapps/pagetools/printlnews.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/africa/4> (explaining how 
the UN watchdog, the office of Oversight Services, investigated the allegations of sexual abuse in 
the Northeast Congolese town of Bunya. The probe found a pattern of sexual exploitation of women 
and children, which it said was continuing. T he report also said that many of the victims were under 
18 with some as young as 13. They were usually given food or small sums of money in return for 
sex). 
127. The first ever war crimes prosecution for using child soldiers was launched in June 2004 
by the international tribunal in Sierra Leone. Prosecutors for the International Criminal Court in The 
Hague are also investigating the use of child soldiers in Uganda and Congo, but charges have yet to 
be laid. See Mike Crawley, New Push to Stop Child Soldiers, (visited on Jan.12, 2005) 
<http://www.Csmonitor.coml20Q4/1118/p06s02-woaf.htm> . 
128. See id. (governments that use child soldiers include Burma, Burundi, Congo, Guinea, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda). 
129. See id. (stating that the United States has used l7-year-olds in Iraq, but later withdrew 
them). 
130. Some of the root causes of conflicts are ethnic rivalry, political power struggle, self-
determination, resource control, genocide, religious differences etc. 
131. See. Isebil/ v. Gruhn. Human Rights Abuses in Africa: Local Problems. Global Obliga-
tions, I HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW 73 (Oct.-Dec. 1999). 
132. See id. 
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has passed a series of resolutions condemning the recruitment and use of 
children in hostilities. 133 The appointment of Olara Otunnu, as the 
United Nations Special Representative on Children and Anned Conflict 
is a step in the right direction. 134 Hopefully, increased visibility will help 
shape public opinion to change the climate and reduce outside assistance 
to groups that use child soldiers. 135 It could also put their victories at risk 
because of outside pressure and lack of support and recognition. 136 Fi-
nally, the international community should also prohibit or sanction com-
panies or states that sell arms to conflict zones.137 Restricting arms sup-
plies to conflict zones will no doubt reduce armed conflict and encourage 
negotiations to end the conflict. 138 
133. The UN Security Council passed resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000),1379 (2001),1460 
(2003) and 1539 (2004) on children and armed conflict. These resolutions can be found at the UN 
Security Council website. 
134. See Olara Otunnu, supra note 2. 
135. See Gruhn, supra note 131. 
136. See id. 
137. See THE SMALL ARMs SURVEY 2004: RIGHTS AT RISK, A PROJECT OF THE GRADUATE 
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GENEVA. The survey explores the linkages between the 
abuse of human rights and the widespread proliferation, availability, and use of small arms. It exam-
ines the impact of arms exports to states that violate human rights, the role of weapons in violence 
and crime around the world, and the implementation of human rights standards by police forces 
around the world. 
138. See Amnesty International and Oxfam, Shattered Lives: The case for Tough Arms Control 
(visited Jan. 27, 2005) <http://www.amnestyusa.orglarms_tradelcontrolarms_summary.html> (ex-
plaining that uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms by government forces and armed groups 
takes a massive human toll in lost lives, lost livelihoods, and lost opportunities to escape poverty. 
20
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 11 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol11/iss1/3
